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1. INTRODUCTION
Although there is a plethora of applied literature analysing the tax effort
of federal governments, there are few empirical studies about this topic
* We gratefully acknowledge the funding support of the Spanish Institute for Fiscal
Studies, the Regional Government of Arago´n and the European Regional Development
Fund (Public Economics Research Group). The usual disclaimer applies.
† Corresponding author
323
1529-7373/2017
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
324 JAIME VALLE´S-GIME´NEZ AND ANABEL ZA´RATE-MARCO
at sub-central level. There are at least three reasons to analyse local tax
behaviour, beyond the purely academic interest. First, studies about fiscal
accountability analyse financial dependence on transfers from the central
level, without directly tackling the real exercise of tax autonomy by sub-
central governments via tax effort. Second, the literature associated with
equalisation transfers has traditionally focused in the analysis and con-
struction of indicators of fiscal needs, leaving aside the study of tax effort,
even in countries like Spain where tax effort is used as a criterion for the
distribution of state funds. And third, the difficult economic situation that
many Eurozone countries are suffering makes it necessary to review their
subcentral financing systems and adapt them to the new demands of sol-
vency of the European institutions and to the needs of each country. For
this, it will be necessary to know the tax reality of the different jurisdic-
tions, their levels of efficiency and their possibilities as a source of revenue.
This will also enable to test the accuracy of the claims of underfunding
that sub-central governments, like the Spanish, traditionally use to posi-
tion themselves as victims1.
For all that, the aim of this paper is to quantify the use that Spanish
municipalities are making of their tax capacity, i.e., their tax effort. Span-
ish local financing system presents a series of specific characteristics which
make it an especially interesting case for these analyses. First, Spanish
municipalities enjoy a high level of financial autonomy, permitting the ap-
pearance of heterogeneous tax behaviours within a shared national frame-
work. Second, as we explained before, the design of the equalisation trans-
fer model in Spain considers municipalities’ tax effort as one of the factors
determining the allocation of the state transfers. And finally, the aggre-
gate budgetary balance shown by local level of government in Spain is the
result of two measures which were unilaterally adopted by the central gov-
ernment: heavier local taxes (especially on residential property ownership)
and spending cuts (Local Government Rationalisation and Sustainability
Act). However, this overall budgetary situation conceals a widely differing
reality, in which heavily indebted municipalities are found alongside others
with balanced and robust financial accounts (Balaguer-Coll, et al, 2016).
This also justifies the need to examine how the municipalities have used
their tax discretion, in order to assess whether central government interven-
1In fact, a recent paper of Cabaleiro and Buch (2014) confirms that the budgetary
solvency dimension is associated with the tax collection effort. For that purpose they
use the tax effort indicator calculated by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance
for the distribution of state funds, as the result of the difficulty in calculating the tax
effort of the large set of existing municipalities, although they recognize that is not
entirely satisfactory. The drawbacks of this indicator are detailed in Pedraja (2008) and
Sua´rez-Pandiello and Ferna´ndez-Llera (2008).
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tion was necessary, or on the contrary, whether the tax autonomy enjoyed
by the municipalities gave them enough scope to increase their revenue.
Our empirical study takes a sample of 465 Spanish municipalities dur-
ing the period 2002-2008, and presents four unique methodological features
that distinguish it from the emerging corpus of existing international works
about tax effort at sub-central level. First, we use various frontier tech-
niques, which are only now beginning to be used in the field of fiscal federal-
ism in order to calculate tax effort. We also suggest certain improvements
to the estimates in the literature, given that we extend the hypotheses
explaining tax capacity, combining general indicators with specific indica-
tors of tax capacity, and consider new explanatory causes of the use of tax
capacity. Another novelty is that despite the difficulty of obtaining infor-
mation on the socio-economic situation of the smaller municipalities, we
have included local governments of every size in the sample. This is partic-
ularly relevant in a country as Spain, where 60 percent of the municipalities
have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. And finally, we use a dynamic approach
with panel data, rather than the cross-section estimates more often found
in this type of study.
Our results show an average local tax effort between 72-85 percent, which
suggests Spanish municipalities have usually exercised their regulatory ca-
pacity in the tax sphere with great responsibility, although they have a
relevant average room to improve their collection. The Stochastic Fron-
tier Analysis also suggests that for raising tax effort, municipalities can
both make a more intensive use of their tax authority (e.g., raising their
tax rates, eliminating or reducing tax allowances on these taxes, etc.) and
improve the efficiency of the collection (e.g., combating corruption, tax
evasion, etc). The result of tax efforts close to the frontier also highlights
the need for undertaking reforms to raise the potential tax revenue (e.g.,
increasing the maximum tax rates; making compulsory the voluntary taxes;
allowing local governments to access to new tax bases, etc.), leaving the
decision on how to use this potential in the hands of each local government.
We think that these results can be largely extended to other countries, can
be helpful in designing of future tax reforms and can be used to analyse
and solve problems of financial solvency.
The work is structured as follows. In the next section, we define the
concept of tax effort and review the available literature on the subject and
the different methodologies applied in its study. In the third section, we
discuss the peculiarities of the local tax system in Spain, we present the
sample of municipalities we are going to use, and we take two initial ap-
proaches to calculating tax effort: first, using a simple technique based on
the range of tax rates which municipalities can set, and then using var-
ious non-parametric frontier approaches. In the fourth section, in order
to extract practical conclusions that can improve tax collection (if this is
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what the municipality wants), we analyse how intensively municipalities
use their tax capacity and the factors explaining their tax effort, using a
parametric stochastic frontier analysis. This alternative approach, which is
rapidly becoming popular in the sphere of public economy research, enables
us to see what aspects contribute to explaining the gap between potential
and effective tax collection, includes variables reflecting the heterogeneity
of our sample, and corroborates the robustness of the average results ob-
tained with non-parametric approaches. The work ends with a section of
concluding remarks.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON TAX EFFORT
Several approaches to the concept of tax effort have been suggested in
the literature, but none has been universally accepted as satisfactory. The
most widely recognised tendency considers tax effort to be the degree to
which a jurisdiction effectively uses its tax capacity. The tax capacity
of a jurisdiction can be defined as the tax resources which a government
can obtain when making full use of its regulatory power over the taxes
within its reach (legal tax capacity) or the maximum tax revenue that
could be collected in a jurisdiction given its economic, social, institutional
and demographic characteristics (economic tax capacity). In this way, the
numerator of the tax effort (the exercised tax capacity or real collection)
depends on the action of the government, but not the denominator (tax
capacity) which is unobservable and difficult to quantify.
In practice, this tax capacity (denominator) has sometimes been mea-
sured through real present or past tax collections, or via macroeconomic
indicators such as the income or wealth of the territory. A pioneering ex-
ample of this school of thought is Frank’s index (1959), which defines tax
effort as the quotient between the fiscal pressure of the jurisdiction and its
per capita income. Suarez and Ferna´ndez (2008) and Cordero et al. (2010)
used this technique in Spain, although their results were excessively high
in low income territories.
An alternative way to approach tax capacity is the representative tax sys-
tem (ACIR, 1988), which calculates the potential tax revenues that govern-
ments would obtain using the current tax system and applying an average
fiscal pressure to the different tax bases available to them. This method
requires a great deal of information and subjective decisions in the evalu-
ation process. We could include Poveda and Sa´nchez (2002) and Delgado
(2008) in this group of work, because they identify the tax capacity of local
governments in Spain with the highest rates they can set for local taxes.
They calculate the tax effort of municipalities by comparing actual tax
rates versus the maximum permitted rates, although without considering
the other possibilities the law grants for modulating tax collection.
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Given the limitations of the above approaches, the econometric method
is the one used by most empirical studies of tax capacity. The first econo-
metric applications used the least squares analysis (OLS) to estimate the
average tax capacity a jurisdiction should achieve given its characteristics,
and the tax effort was obtained by comparing real tax revenue with the
average revenue estimated using the regression. There are many works us-
ing this methodology at the national level (from the pioneering Lotz and
Morss, 1967, to the recent work of Le et al, 2012), although as far as we
know, at the local level only the papers of Wang et al (2009) for China,
and Cordero et al. (2010) for Spain use it.
Recently a novel methodology has come into use for quantifying tax ca-
pacity, based on the stochastic frontier production possibilities suggested
by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Pessino
and Fenochietto (2010 and 2013), Cyan et al. (2014), Ndiaye and Korsu
(2014) or Zakova and Slabosh (2015) for central governments; Ramı´rez and
Erquizio (2011) and Garg et al. (2017), for regions, as well as the prelimi-
nary approach of Medina (2012) for the Spanish regions; and the research
of Alfirman (2003) and Aguilar (2007) on local governments, have used this
alternative to conventional econometric estimation by least squares. This
methodology uses maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a stochastic
tax frontier. In this way, the tax capacity of a jurisdiction will be considered
the maximum collection level it could obtain with an efficient exploitation
of its tax bases and effective management of its taxes. Statistically, this
idea means a regression model has to be specified for the tax frontier with
two error terms, v and u, where v represents the usual statistical noise,
and u represents the error in obtaining the maximum amount of revenue
for given inputs. Furthermore, u is a function of a series of explanatory
variables or exogenous factors which are associated with the municipality’s
tax margin and may vary over time. The tax effort index is constructed by
comparing real revenue with the estimated frontier or potential tax revenue,
so it cannot exceed 100 percent. No economic agent can be located beyond
the frontier, so that any deviation from it will represent each jurisdiction’s
margin to raise its revenue to the “potential” maximum.
To a much more limited extent, other techniques have been tried in tax
effort studies, which although not parametric, share the frontier approach
and are frequently found in evaluations of the efficiency of units of pro-
duction. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), designed in its current form
by Charnes et al. (1978), constructs an enveloping surface where the local
governments that obtained the maximum level of tax collection based on
the inputs would be, so that the tax collecting margin of the municipalities
could be measured by their distance from the frontier. DEA has been used
to measure the tax effort of municipalities in Colombia (Departamento Na-
cional de Planeacio´n, 2005) and in several states in India (Thirtle et al,
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2000 and Rajaraman and Goyal, 2012). Its non-convex version, the Free
Disposal Hull (FDH) model proposed by Deprins et al. (1984), has been
less used. As far as we know, only Mattos et al. (2011) have used it to mea-
sure efficiency in the collection of municipal taxes in Brazil. With FDH, a
municipality which does not exploit its maximum tax-gathering potential
will be compared with a real municipality which obtains more tax income,
and not a virtual one constructed from linear combinations (as in the DEA
model).
There are two more recent developments, the so-called order-m (Cazals
et al, 2002) and order-α (Aragon et al, 2005) partial frontier approaches,
which are generalisations of the FDH and do not envelop all the data.
Although they are beginning to be used in business efficiency studies,
they have not yet found a place in the field of fiscal federalism. These
non-parametric partial frontier methods allow atypical or super-efficient
efficiency observations, i.e., beyond the estimated tax collection frontier,
making it possible to greatly reduce sensitivity to errors of measurement
and outliers.
To summarise, the review of the literature leads us to conclude that
there is ample international empirical evidence for calculating tax effort
at the national level, although there are still few empirical studies about
this topic at sub-central level. The problem of the availability of applied
research becomes more acute in the case both of municipalities, especially
the smallest ones, due to the problems of information they present, and
of the works that consider several years at the same time (panel data).
Alongside this, the existence of various analytical techniques, each with its
pros and cons, requires us to be aware of the limitations of the approach
used at any time, and as far as possible, allows us to apply alternative
methodologies in order to take advantage of the merits of each method
and overcome its weaknesses, while checking the robustness of the results
obtained.
3. QUANTIFICATION OF THE USE OF TAX CAPACITY IN
SPANISH MUNICIPALITIES
In Spain, the law (Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2004, de 5 de marzo,
Texto Refundido de la Ley Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales, onwards
TRLRHL) establishes a standard framework for local government taxation
throughout the territory, and rules that municipalities can use the revenue
collected through five taxes: Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmue-
bles, IBI), levied on the value of each real estate property in the munic-
ipality; Economic Activity Tax (Impuesto sobre Actividades Econo´micas,
IAE), levied on the income presumably obtained from economic activity
in the municipality; the Motor Vehicle Tax (Impuesto sobre Veh´ıculos de
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Traccio´n Meca´nica, IVTM), on the ownership of any vehicle which can
legally be driven; the Building Work and Installations Tax (Impuesto so-
bre Construcciones, Instalaciones y Obras, ICIO), on any building work
or civil engineering; and the Tax on Increase in Urban Land Value (Im-
puesto sobre el Incremento del Valor de los Terrenos de Naturaleza Urbana,
IIVTNU), levied on the capital gains obtained on transfers of urban land.
The laws applying to these five taxes are State-wide, although local gov-
ernments have some regulatory capacity which they can exercise within
certain limits, as established in the TRLRHL. Thus, the amount of Span-
ish local tax revenue can be influenced by at least six optional factors. First,
municipalities have a certain amount of discretion when setting the rates
of these taxes. Second, they can affect the amount of the tax bases insofar
as, for example, they may decide to revise the cadastral values of proper-
ties2, to modify the IAE tax liability within certain limits (depending on
the category of street on which economic activity takes place), etc. Third,
they can use techniques that combine the two mechanisms above, so that,
for example, if the amount of the tax base is increased, the tax rate applied
can be reduced. Fourth, they have the power within the municipal area
to decide whether to impose two taxes: the ICIO and the IIVTNU, which
are optional. Fifth, they have the regulatory capacity to establish certain
exemptions and rebates. For example, a local government can decide to
exempt properties used in healthcare, etc., from the IBI; the IAE can be
rebated for activities that have created jobs; etc. And finally, there are sig-
nificant differences between municipalities in terms of management, control
and inspection capacity, which can have an impact on tax collection. For
example, collecting the ICIO largely depends on both the local government
monitoring building work in the municipality and how far building work is
accurately reflected in its budget, insofar as the taxable basis of the ICIO
is the cost of the work to be carried out, which must be provided to the
local Administration by the taxpayer.
All of these elements can give local government considerable capacity
to act in the sphere of taxes, and therefore we believe it is important to
quantify the available or unexploited tax margin still within reach for the
units of this level of government. This is precisely the task we will be dealing
with in the next sections. Given the wide range of techniques to calculate
tax effort used in the literature, we will be using different approaches in
this work. First, we will start calculating the quotient between the tax
rates set by municipalities and the maximums permitted by the TRLRHL,
2The cadastral value of the property constitutes the tax basis of the IBI and is revised
at the same time for all the properties in the municipality, by a central agency, at the
request of the local government. The cadastral value is also used for calculating the
tax basis of the IIVTNU, which the local government can also decide on by applying
percentages and reductions, within certain limits.
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due to the simplicity of this method. Second, we will test the tax revenue
margin obtained with this approach by applying various non-parametric
frontier techniques. We will estimate the explanatory factors behind the
different usage levels of tax capacity in section four, at the same time
as the municipal tax capacity, using the parametric Stochastic Frontier
Approach (SFA). This will also let us check the robustness of the previous
methods and complete and modulate their results adding new elements to
the analysis.
3.1. The database
The sample in our empirical exercise consists of 465 municipalities in
four regions of Spain (Arago´n, Cantabria, Galicia and Madrid) for which
we were able to find all the socio-economic information we needed. The data
cover information from 2002 to 2008, both inclusive, and municipalities of
every size, as can be seen in the left side of Table 1, which provides the
composition of the sample by region and population size. The right side of
this table also shows the distribution of municipalities in each of the four
Spanish regions considered in the paper, by population size, which lets us
contextualise the sample in the real municipal situation. These data show
that the weight of municipalities with under 5,000 inhabitants is lower in
the sample than in reality, due to the impossibility of obtaining part of the
data needed for our analysis from the smallest municipalities. Despite this,
the smaller municipalities are in the majority in our sample (59 percent),
and most (90 percent) do not exceed 20,000 inhabitants, in line with the
real municipal situation in Spain, where 95 percent of municipalities are
under this population level.
TABLE 1.
Distribution of municipalities by population segment
Composition of the sample (in percent)Spanish municipal structure (in percent)
POPULATION Aragon Cantabria Galicia Madrid Total Aragon Cantabria Galicia Madrid Total
SEGMENT sample sample
POP < 5, 001 75.95 73.13 54.88 42.47 59.14 97.26 82.35 60.95 66.48 83.79
5, 001 ≤ POP < 20, 000 20.25 20.90 37.40 26.03 30.32 2.33 13.73 33.02 18.44 11.31
20, 001 ≤ POP < 50, 000 2.53 2.99 4.88 12.33 5.38 0.27 1.96 3.81 6.70 3.11
50, 001 ≤ POP < 100, 000 0.00 1.49 1.63 8.22 2.37 0.00 0.98 1.27 3.91 1.02
POP ≥ 100, 000 1.27 1.49 1.22 10.96 2.80 0.14 0.98 0.95 4.47 0.76
Total number of 79 67 246 73 465 730 102 315 179 8,114
municipalities
Source: By the authors, based on INE data
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3.2. Calculating the local tax effort using the tax rates quotient
(TRQ)
As a first approach to municipal tax effort, based somehow in the rep-
resentative fiscal system, we calculate for each of five Spanish local taxes
the quotient between the tax rate set by the local government (calculated
based on data provided by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance) and
the legal maximum permitted by the TRLRHL. From this, we can make
an aggregated calculation of the tax effort of each municipality for the five
taxes, as the average of the quotients of each tax weighted with the real
tax collection from each one.
To do this, we took a set of particularities into account. For the IBI,
we weighted the quotient of tax rates (set/maximum) of rural and urban
real estate property, with the weight in the municipality of the aggregate
value of these goods, rural and urban, respectively. For the IAE we have
calculated the ratio between the highest situational coefficient set by the
local government and the maximum permitted by TRLRHL. For the IVTM,
as municipalities can increase the rate applicable to each type of vehicle in a
different way, we have calculated the ratio using the rate applicable to cars,
as these vehicles provide most of the tax revenue, and more specifically, cars
with 8 to 15.99 tax horsepower, as these are the majority. For the IIVTNU,
as local governments can set a different tax rate according to the period
of time when the capital gains were generated, we used the ratio between
the simple average of the tax rates established in the municipality and the
maximum rate they can set according to TRLRHL. For the ICIO, we used
the ratio between the tax rate set and the maximum allowed by TRLRHL.
The results, which we present in Table 2, are slightly lower than those
obtained by Poveda and Sa´nchez (2002), although it must be borne in
mind that almost all our work corresponds to the period after the reform
of the local financial system, which came into force in 2003 and raised the
maximum tax rates which could be set by most local governments in local
taxes, i.e., the denominator of the ratios. In fact, the tax effort ratios we
have calculated for 2002, the first year in the period we are studying, are
fairly close to those in the study by Poveda and Sa´nchez for 1999.
Our calculations show that the average tax effort (2002-2008) of the five
taxes was 56.24-69.07 percent, depending on whether all the municipalities
are considered (scenario a) or only those that apply any of the two optional
taxes (scenario b). Significant differences are also seen in the degree of effort
made with each tax. With the compulsory taxes the average tax effort was
52.34 percent. The greatest tax effort was made for IVTM (61.22 percent),
followed by IBI (50.60 percent) and, a distant third, IAE (37.53 percent).
It is possible that the lower visibility of IVTM and the processes of tax
competition in IAE to attract economic activity, explain these results.
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TABLE 2.
Local tax effort (in percentage). Tax rate quotient approach (TRQ).
Discretionary taxes Total taxes
Compulsory taxes Scenario a Scenario b Scenario a Scenario b
IBI IVTM IAE TOTAL ICIO IIVTNU ICIO IIVTNU
2002 59.77 68.83 54.02 61.02 83.33 38.09 89.08 82.00 66.19 85.32
2003 48.21 57.67 31.04 49.14 56.35 34.20 59.72 73.35 51.28 67.08
2004 48.91 58.51 33.49 49.87 59.49 36.05 62.74 75.00 53.36 65.86
2005 49.27 59.82 35.04 50.92 62.01 39.31 64.84 75.33 55.29 67.18
2006 49.22 60.55 35.82 51.45 63.10 40.82 66.10 75.90 56.08 66.82
2007 49.16 61.10 36.20 51.69 64.06 41.76 66.95 76.26 56.07 66.85
2008 49.57 62.02 36.98 52.23 65.74 42.28 68.41 77.22 55.33 67.03
AVERAGE 50.60 61.22 37.53 52.34 64.89 38.93 68.25 76.42 56.24 69.07
Scenario a: The calculations were made considering all the municipalities in the sample.
Scenario b: The calculations were made considering only the municipalities that apply optional
taxes.
Source: By the authors.
In the discretionary taxes, there is a greater tax effort with CIO (64.89
percent) than with IIVTNU (38.93 percent). Moreover, these ratios rise
considerably (68.25 percent and 76.42 percent, respectively) in scenario
b, coming closer to the calculations of Poveda and Sa´nchez (2002) and
IIVTNU becoming the local tax where the greatest use is made of tax
power. This scenario b shows that when a municipality decides to impose
either of the two optional taxes, it does so at levels closer to the legal
maximum. The great difference seen in IIVTNU between scenarios a and
b (in Table 2) is because many local governments have decided not to
implement this tax.
The results also show a large drop in the level of tax effort in 2003 with
all local taxes, due to the reform of the local financing system that came
into force that year. That reform enabled all municipalities, whatever their
population, to set the same maximum tax rates permitted for the largest
municipalities3.
This simple way of calculating municipal tax effort uses very precise but
limited information, as it only takes into account the rates set for local taxes
compared to the legally permitted maximums. It could be a simple way of
measuring the legal tax capacity of a jurisdiction, defined above, although
it ignores many of the factors we saw in the previous section in which
local governments also have some freedom to act and which enable them
to differentiate themselves in terms of tax revenue (decisions on rebates
3Before the reform, the larger the size of the municipality the greater the maximum
tax rate that could be set.
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and exemptions, modulation of taxable bases, effective management of tax
collection, etc.), but which are not easy to get information about. This,
together with the fact that to calculate these ratios we had to adopt a series
of subjective and therefore questionable assumptions, is the fundamental
weakness of this approach. Therefore, we are going to use other techniques
which let us calculate in a better way the tax power used by municipalities
while minimising the required information. With these other techniques we
will approach the economic tax capacity of a jurisdiction, as opposed to the
legal one, measuring the amount of revenue that an economy can collect,
given its economic, social, institutional and demographic characteristics.
3.3. Calculating the local tax effort using non-parametric fron-
tier techniques
Frontier techniques, particularly non-parametric ones, enjoy only an in-
cipient popularity for estimating tax capacity, when they are methods that
should work well in the field of taxation studies given that tax revenue
can be considered the output of governments’ tax policy and can be ob-
tained based on a set of inputs such as income, tax bases, etc. There are
also similarities between the problems of governments in generating tax
revenue and the problems of firms in producing their output, since both
agents are concerned about potential tax revenues or production which is
not obtained by a poor management or inefficiency.
Regarding the non-parametric frontier methodology, we have applied two
variants. On one hand, the FDH, by adopting an output approach given
that any local government can maximise its tax collection under its par-
ticular socioeconomics conditions and characteristics. On the other, the
partial frontier approaches, Order-m and Order-α, which permit extreme
efficiency observations, beyond the frontier.
To apply these techniques we took as output the revenue obtained with
the five local taxes, TAX. These taxes provided two-thirds of the tax rev-
enues of the municipalities, so we amply covered the sources of income
which could be distributed in a highly uneven manner among the munici-
palities. Table 3 shows the definition of each variable used, the source the
data were obtained from and the main descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables4.
4All monetary variables were deflated with the CPI.
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TABLE 3.
Definition, source and statistics describing the variables
Variables Source of the information Average Std. Dev. Min Max
TAX Ministry of the Economy and Finance 6,100,089 54,700,000 27,919.86 1,450,000,000
PROPVpc Directorate General for Cadastre 21,829.66 19,321.65 3,434.35 236,332.80
T0 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
T5 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
T10 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
VEHICpc Economic Yearbook of Spain. La Caixa 610.67 106.41 295.79 1,308.84
dREFORM
POP National Institute of Statistics 20,549.70 150,660.90 139.00 3,213,271.00
OLDPOP 23.76 9.75 3.42 53.43
INCOMEpc Regional Institutes of Statistics 10,777.84 2,537.51 4,971.18 26,548.46
dCRISIS
dTR 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
TRQ-IBI By the authors, based on data from the 0.51 0.13 0.21 0.99
Ministry of the Economy and Finance
TRQ-IAE 0.38 0.19 0.13 1.00
TRQ-IVTM 0.61 0.11 0.50 1.00
TWOVOLT Based on data from the Ministry 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
of the Economy and Finance
COLLECTpc 19.43 48.17 0.00 964.04
PROPINCpc Ministry of the Economy and Finance 20.61 89.22 0.00 3,015.54
ILLUSIONpc 414.96 261.67 105.61 5,145.27
TEXPENSpc 768.92 512.37 0.00 7,598.06
DEBTEXPENSpc 32.00 89.74 0.00 4,341.70
dPRE Ministry of the Interior
POLITCOMP 4.04 5.83 0.00 28.98
POLITCOLOUR 1.27 0.94 0.00 2.00
dPOP1 National Institute of Statistics 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Source: By the authors.
Description of the variable
TAX Tax collected by the municipality
PROPVpc Cadastral value per capita of urban and rural properties
T0 =1 the year when the municipal cadastre was revised, =0 in other
years
T5 =1 when more than 5 years have passed since the last revision of the
cadastre, =0 otherwise
T10 =1 when more than 10 years have passed since the last revision of
the cadastre, =0 otherwise
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VEHICpc Number of vehicles per 1000 inhabitants
dREFORM = 0 in 2002, when the reform of the local financing system
was not in force, =1 in other years
POP Population of the municipality
OLDPOP Percent of the population over 65
INCOMEpc Per capita income
dCRISIS =1 the year 2008 in which the crisis began in Spain, = 0
otherwise
dTR = 1 when the ratio between the average tax rate applied in the
municipality and the maximum rate permitted by law (i.e., the tax rates
quotient calculated in section 3.2) is above the average, = 0 otherwise
TRQ-IBI Ratio of rates set in the IBI for rural property assets and for
urban property assets in relation to the maximum rates permitted for these
properties in the TRLRHL, weighted with the weight the aggregate value
of these rural and urban assets have in the municipality, respectively.
TRQ-IAE The highest situational coefficient set by the local govern-
ment / maximum coefficient permitted by the TRLRHL
TRQ-IVTM Ratio between the rates set for cars, 8 - 15.99 fiscal horse-
power, and the maximum possible rates that the TRLRHL permits for
these vehicles, according to the population of the municipality.
TWOVOLT = 1 when the municipality requires the two optional taxes,
=0 otherwise
COLLECTpc Difference between budgeted and actually received in-
come from local taxes, per capita
PROPINCpc Per capita income from assets
ILLUSIONpc Income from current and capital borrowing and trans-
fers, in per capita terms
TEXPENSpc Per capita spending
DEBTEXPENSpc Per capita spending on interest payments and amor-
tisation of the principal
dPRE =1 in an election year and the year before; =0 otherwise
POLITCOMP percent of votes obtained −50 percent
POLITCOLOUR Dummy = 1 if a regionalist party is in government,
2 if a right-wing party is, and 0 otherwise
dPOP1 =1 if the municipality < 1, 000 inhabitants, =0 in otherwise
To choose the input, we considered the available empirical evidence about
sub-central tax behaviour and the fact that tax capacity is independent
of the government’s actions. Owing to these considerations we included
as input the tax bases of both IBI and IVTM, which are the two taxes
providing more revenue to the municipalities (51 percent and 15 percent
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of municipal tax revenue, respectively5). As tax basis for IBI we used the
per capita cadastral value of the real estate property in the municipality
(PROPVpc), which coincides exactly with the real tax base. And as tax
basis for IVTM, we used the number of vehicles per 1000 inhabitants of
each municipality (VEHIC). Alongside this, given that we were unable to
find proxies for the tax bases of the other local taxes, we used three general
indicators of tax capacity often used in the literature: population, the
percentage of the population aged over 65, and income.
The results in Figure 1 show that the average local tax effort is between
72.15 and 85.22 percent, depending on the non-parametric technique used6.
The tax margin is smaller than that obtained via the TRQ, which we have
also included (only scenario a) in this Figure for comparison. This diver-
gence in the results could indicate that, although municipalities have a
high margin in terms of both tax rates and the implementation of optional
taxes, if the analysis is refined considering different indicators of tax capac-
ity (such as the bases of certain taxes and other more general indicators
like population or income), the range within which municipalities can in-
crease their tax collection revenues is much more restricted. The legal tax
capacity is greater than the economic one (Khwaja and Iyer, 2014), so the
legal tax effort is reasonably lower than the economic one.
The distribution of municipalities by tax effort deciles, in Figure 2, shows
a high degree of asymmetry in municipal behaviour when using the non-
parametric frontier approaches. These approaches are represented with
bars. Thus, many units of observation (around 43-46 percent) that are
making full use of their tax potential coexist with a considerable group
(rough 30-37 percent) with tax efforts below 70 percent, which therefore
still has a wide margin for increase. Surprisingly, these techniques also
place many municipalities in the first deciles7, when the TRQ (represented
with a dotted line) shows that the municipalities making the least effort
locate at best in the fourth decile. At the same time, we can see that with
the partial frontier techniques there are few observations (3-6 percent) out-
side the estimated frontier. This shows the nature of this approach, which
allows for super-efficient observations. These are usually large municipal-
ities, including provincial capitals, so it makes sense for them to present
5Based on data supplied by the D.G. of Financial Coordination with the Autonomous
Regions and Local Governments (Ministry of the Economy and Finance), corresponding
to the settlement of the budgets of local governments, 2002-2008.
6Although it does not appear in this document, we have carried out a sensitivity anal-
ysis of the efficiency indicators, calculating the metafrontiers for m = 12, 22, 50, . . . , 200
and α = 90, 95, . . . , 97, whose estimations give robustness to the results presented, and
can be provided to readers upon request.
7We have not seen any particularly notable feature in this group of municipalities,
except that they are usually municipalities of under 10,000 inhabitants where property
values are not very high.
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FIG. 1. Tax effort of the Spanish local governments (in percent)
	
Source: By the authors
special tax behaviours (large constructions and buildings, industrial poly-
gons, big commercial areas). In contrast, the TRQ locates practically all
the observations in the central ranges of tax effort.
FIG. 2. Distribution of municipalities by tax effort deciles
	
Source: By the authors
338 JAIME VALLE´S-GIME´NEZ AND ANABEL ZA´RATE-MARCO
4. FACTORS EXPLAINING MUNICIPAL TAX EFFORT
AND THE STOCHASTIC TAX FRONTIER
Our study is completed by implementing the SFA, an alternative method-
ology, to check and adjust the results obtained with the previous approaches
and to determine the explanatory factors behind the different levels of tax
effort, estimating them simultaneously with the frontier tax revenue. This
can also be done with procedures associated with non-parametric tech-
niques (Daraio and Simar, 2007), but a parametric approach, such as SFA,
will enrich the analysis of tax effort we are implementing, furthermore
allowing us to take the advantages and minimize the limitations of each
method (nonparametric and stochastic), and to check the robustness of
our obtained results. SFA is a parametric technique, increasingly popular
internationally in empirical studies of tax effort, which allows us to see if
the hypotheses on the relationship between input (tax bases and general
indicators of tax capacity) and output (potential tax collection) are sig-
nificant, something which is particularly interesting in a study like ours.
It also allows us to add dummies which identify possible causes of sample
heterogeneity on the frontier, as we have very different municipalities.
4.1. Hypotheses
To estimate the stochastic tax frontier, we used as explanatory variables
on one hand, the inputs included in the non-parametric applications, i.e.,
the tax basis of IBI and IVTM (PROPVpc and VEHIC) and the three
general indicators of tax capacity (POP, OLDPOP and INCOMEpc); and
on the other hand, via dummies, different aspects of the socioeconomic
context which we think can be highly relevant. First, in order to be able
to compare the cadastral values of the municipalities despite having been
revised in different years, we have included three fictitious variables (T0,
T5 and T10) which capture the years passed since the latest revision, so
that they interact with PROPVpc. Secondly, we wanted to test, with
the dummy dREFORM, the possible implications for tax capacity of the
reform of the local finance system. This reform came into force in January
2003 and significantly affected local taxes (e.g., the maximum tax rates of
the local taxes were all raised as was the maximum situational coefficient
for the IAE, all individuals plus companies with a turnover of under a
million euros were exempted from IAE, etc.). And, finally, we capture with
dCRISIS the possible effect of the onset of the crisis on local tax capacity8.
8We tried to include other variables (the unemployment rate, the weight of the agri-
cultural sector,. . . ) but none were significant or improved the model. Although some
papers include transfers received from other levels of government as an explanatory vari-
able (among others, Dahlberg et al., 2008), we believe this aspect does not affect the
tax capacity estimated, although it could be included as a factor explaining the level of
tax collecting, as we have done later.
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To estimate the determinants of the unused potential tax revenue, we
considered that in the tax sphere the difference between real and frontier
output can only be interpreted as the not obtained part of the potential
tax revenue, but it cannot be seen as a measurement associated exclusively
with inefficiency. It can be really caused by at least two groups of fac-
tors: on one hand, by political decisions regarding the own revenues the
local government wants to obtain, i.e., the tax effort may be intentionally
low; on the other, by inefficiency in the municipality’s tax management
and collection process which may be due to corruption, tax evasion, poor
management, the use of obsolete tax administration technology, a lack of
suitable human resources, etc. Despite this, it can be a useful indicator
to identify the municipalities that would be able to increase their tax rev-
enues. More concretely, we have suggested five groups of causes explaining
heterogeneous behaviour in the use of potential tax revenues.
A first set of factors, associated with the tax provisions deliberately
adopted by municipalities to get a specific tax collection, includes two dum-
mies which take the value 1 when the municipality sets high local tax rates
(dHTR) and when the municipality requires the two optional taxes (TWO-
VOLT). A second group, related to the existence of alternative local income
sources other than taxes, includes the income from the assets management
(PROPINCpc) and the income which generates a financial or fiscal illu-
sion (ILLUSIONpc). We include in a third group the total volume of local
spending (TSPENSpc) and, attempting to gather certain aspects linked
to the quality of credit management, the spending on interest payments
and repayment of debts (DEBTEXPENSpc). This variable measures the
pressure of postponing part of the tax effort through debt, the cost of
which increases with the volume of accumulated debt given that the finan-
cial markets penalise the most indebted. This discipline introduced by the
market enables us to connect to the fourth group of hypotheses, related
to the management quality of local governments. This group includes, on
one hand, a variable covering the difference between budgeted and actually
collected local tax revenue (COLLECTpc), which would capture the inef-
ficiency in the collection; and on the other hand, a dummy to capture the
poorer management capacity of small municipalities (POP1), although it
would also capture the greatest difficulty for its residents to avoid taxes.
In the fifth group are the political variables which, as shown in the review
by Benito et al. (2010) can influence the tax collection of a jurisdiction. We
have included a variable which measures the level of competition the gov-
ernment faces (POLITCOMP), a qualitative variable (POLITCOLOUR)
intended to show whether the degree of discretionary tax collection de-
pends on the ideology of the party in power in the local government, and a
fictitious variable (PRE) to test the electoral cycle thesis, which postulates
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that in pre-election periods the governments tend to take popular measures
(e.g. reduce tax effort) postponing their cost until the next years.
4.2. Results for local tax effort using the SFA
In light of the hypotheses discussed above, we have estimated with panel
data (2002-2008) and in a single stage, the following equations (1) and
(2) of the stochastic tax frontier model, with random effects proposed by
Greene (2005) and Belotti et al. (2012)9.
TAX = f(PROPVpc,PROPVpc ∗ T0,PROPVpc ∗ T5,PROPVpc ∗ T10,
VEHICpc,POP,OLDPOP, INCOMEpc,dREFORM,dCRISIS) (1)
u = g(dHTR,TWOVOLT,PROPINCpc, ILLUSIONpc,TEXPENSpc,
DEBTEXPENSpc,COLLECTpc,POP1,POLITCOMP, (2)
POLITCOLOUR,DPRE)
The results of this estimation, which we carried out using the STATATM
statistical package and taking the variables in logarithms, are shown in Ta-
ble 4. We corroborate the suitability of the SFA as method of estimation
of the tax effort, from the null hypothesis test that quantifies whether the
contribution of the variance of u to the total variance of the error is sig-
nificant (H0: γ = 0). As λ estimator is significant in the model, the null
hypothesis that γ equals 0 is rejected, which confirms the suitability of the
SFA as method of study in this case, i.e. the need to include the unrealized
tax effort, u, in the tax capacity function, which should not be approxi-
mated using an estimated average behaviour function (OLS). Additionally,
the significant value of θ suggests that unobserved heterogeneity of mu-
nicipalities must be separated from the inefficiency effects, which validates
the Greene (2005) approaches we use10. Meanwhile, the significance of
the variables explaining the exercise of tax power validates the suggested
equation.
The results are consistent with the theoretical expectations and the avail-
able empirical evidence (Lotz and Mors, 1967; Allers et al., 2001; Pessino
and Fenochietto, 2010, or Delgado et al., 2015, among others). All the
variables in the tax frontier equation (1) are relevant. The tax basis of the
taxes, especially the value of real estate property, has a positive influence
on potential tax collection, according to the relative importance of the IBI
in municipal tax revenues. Moreover, the effect of PROPVpc is greater, in
9In the true random effects model (TRE), the municipalities share the constant term
of the specification. Although Farsi et al (2006 and 2007) point out that TRE models
yield the most plausible estimations of efficiency, we have also tested the fixed effects
approach of Greene (2005), in which the constant term is different for each municipality,
with the model giving similar results.
10See Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2006).
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TABLE 4.
Results of the stochastic tax frontier model
Model 1 Model 2
Tax frontier
PROPVpc 0.4239∗∗ 0.4320∗∗
(16.49) (16.40)
PROPVpc * T0 −0.0129∗∗ −0.0131∗∗
(−3.81) (−3.87)
PROPVpc * T5 0.0109∗∗ 0.0101∗∗
(4.86) (4.46)
PROPVpc * T10 0.0029 0.0034
(1.30) (1.50)
VEHICpc 0.1871∗∗ 0.1774∗∗
(2.54) (2.43)
POP 0.9724∗∗ 0.9662∗∗
(74.76) (72.23)
OLDPOP −0.0084∗∗ −0.0105∗∗
(−4.25) (−5.54)
INCOMEpc 0.2851∗∗ 0.2472∗∗
(3.56) (3.11)
dREFORM 0.1903∗∗ 0.2615∗∗
(8.15) (10.08)
dCRISIS −0.0937∗∗ −0.1051∗∗
(−3.69) (−4.23)
CONS −2.3119∗∗ −1.9834∗∗
(−3.34) (−2.95)
general, the longer it has been since the last cadastral revision. A €100 in-
crease in the cadastral value increases potential tax revenue, in model 1, by
€42.39 if the assessment delay is less than 5 years, and by €43.48 if it is 5
to 10 years (coefficient of PROPVpc + coefficient of PROPVpc ∗T5), with
an impact of €41.1 in the year of the revision (coefficient of PROPVpc +
coefficient of PROPVpc ∗ T0). The model also reveals that the reform of
the local finance system (dREFORM) substantially raised the local tax ca-
pacity, as could be expected from the increase in the maximum tax rates of
all local taxes, and despite the IAE exemption for many business owners.
Regarding the general indices of ability to pay, while the retirement-age
population (OLDPOP) negatively influences the local tax capacity, pop-
ulation (POP) and income (INCOMEpc) are a clear and direct positive
influence, this last one confirmed by the sign and significance of dCRISIS.
This flexibility shown in our estimation (and in Poveda and Sa´nchez, 2002)
by the local tax capacity when faced with changes in the economic cycle,
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TABLE 4—Continued
Unused tax capacity or unrealized tax effort
dTR −0.1910∗∗
(−6.60)
TRQ-IBI −0.7919∗∗
(−5.45)
TRQ-IAE −0.3377∗∗
(−4.35)
TRQ-IVTM −0.4622∗∗
(−2.38)
TWOVOLT −0.1060∗∗ −0.0755∗∗
(−3.70) (−2.62)
ILLUSIONpc −0.0034 −0.0340
(−0.14) (−1.34)
PROPINCpc −0.0269∗∗ −0.0243∗∗
(−4.07) (−3.65)
dPRE −0.0004 −0.0009
(−0.02) (−0.05)
POLITCOMP 0.0021 0.0023
(0.23) (0.23)
POLITCOLOUR −0.0097 −0.0237∗
(−0.79) (−1.79)
TEXPENSpc −0.0053 −0.0040
(−0.91) (−0.64)
DEBTEXPENSpc −0.0263∗∗ −0.0236∗∗
(−3.64) (−3.31)
COLLECTpc 0.0420∗∗ 0.0477∗∗
(7.18) (8.31)
dPOB1 −0.2824∗∗ −0.2032∗∗
(−3.46) (−2.71)
CONS 0.5984∗∗ 1.4047∗∗
(3.69) (6.88)
θ 0.2316∗∗ 0.2299∗∗
(20.22) (19.95)
λ(H0 : γ = σ2ν/σ
2
Σ = 0) 0.3514
∗∗ 0.2998∗∗
(15.53) (13.07)
(∗∗) Significance at 1 percent and (∗) at 5 percent.
Standard errors are in parentheses
Source: By the authors
calls into question one of the main disadvantages historically attributed
to the Spanish local tax system: its rigidity in reacting to changes in the
economic cycle.
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Regarding the hypotheses explaining the intensity of use of tax capac-
ity, or rather the unrealized tax effort [equation 2], the results are quite
in line with what is theoretically expected and with the available empiri-
cal evidence (Pessino and Fenochieto, 2010). The variables capturing the
willingness of municipalities to obtain tax revenue making use of the reg-
ulatory capacity granted by the TRLRHL (TWOVOLT and dHTR), have
a strong and positive influence on the tax effort made11. As an alternative
to dHTR, we have included in model 2 of Table 4, the TRQ separately for
each on the compulsory taxes. The coefficients of these ratios suggest that
IBI is the local tax in which the decision to raise tax rates has a greater
influence on the available tax revenue margin, followed by IVTM and IAE.
These results are in line with the weight of these taxes in tax revenue, and
corroborates that local taxation basically depends on real estate property.
The existence of alternative local income sources other than tax rev-
enue does not create the substitution effect or financial illusion expected
(ILLUSIONpc), according to both theory and empirical evidence (Garg
et al., 2017). Further, the asset income variable (PROPINCpc) is shown
to be complementary to tax revenue, so that when there are budget ten-
sions the municipality seeks tax revenue and income from assets, showing
a consistent and responsible behaviour, not misled by money illusion phe-
nomena. Although total spending does not appear to condition the local
tax effort, financial spending (DEBTEXPENSpc) has a positive influence,
which reflects the pressure arising from postponing part of the tax effort by
acquiring debt. Regarding the variables associated with management qual-
ity, the greater the difference between budgeted and actually collected local
tax revenue, i.e., inefficiency in tax collection (COLLECTpc), the further
the municipality remains from its potential revenue. The results also show
that very small municipalities (POP1) make high tax efforts, which may
be due to the supporting work of the Provincial Councils, but is surely also
because the small size of a jurisdiction facilitates control and inspection,
making it more difficult to hide taxable bases.
However, political variables are not shown to be relevant to explaining
the local tax effort. Only the political colour (POLITCOLOUR) has any
influence. Particularly, tax effort is greater when the governing party is
right-wing.
Figure 1 shows that with the SFA the municipalities collect on average
71.9 percent of their potential tax revenue. This indicator is in line with the
results obtained with the non-parametric techniques, for which we obtained
tax effort levels of 72-85 percent. The percentage distribution of munic-
ipalities by tax effort deciles resulting from the SFA (shown in Figure 2
11The results are similar when the dummy is constructed taking into account tax
effort with only the compulsory taxes.
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with a broken line) places all the municipalities below the tax frontier, by
technique definition. The municipalities which make the least tax effort are
in the fifth decile. Around 93 percent of the observation units are located
in the 50-90 percent tax effort bands and only the 5 percent have a max-
imum margin of 10 percentage points. The SFA generates an inverted-U
distribution of municipalities similar to that of the TRQ (dotted line), but
shifted to the right, which corresponds to the greater average level of tax
effort obtained with the SFA. This gap can be attributed to the different
methodology and to the factors which are not considered with the TRQ12.
According to Badunenko et al. (2012), the not very high value of ? might
suggest that nonparametric frontiers approaches are preferable to SFA. In
this sense, we must point out that the former are more flexible methods
(especially since they do not require specifying a functional form) than
the latter, and that the nonparametric partial frontier approaches specif-
ically allow to identify those super-efficient municipalities collecting more
revenues probably because of their atypical tax bases (large constructions
and buildings, industrial polygons, nuclear power plants, big commercial
areas, toll roads, wetlands). However, the location of municipalities in the
first deciles of tax effort with non-parametric techniques, contradicts the
reality which, on the contrary, TRQ and SFA do capture. According to
these, there are not municipalities with null tax effort and most munic-
ipalities are concentrated in the upper central deciles. In addition, SFA
offers decisive advantages such as being able to identify the significance
of the variables considered, establishing explanatory hypotheses of the un-
used tax capacity, and estimating simultaneously the tax frontier and the
unused tax potential, in order to avoid bias in the estimations. And fi-
nally, it must be taking into account that in a scenario such as the tax one,
where the difference between real and frontier output cannot be seen as a
measurement associated exclusively with inefficiency, the non-parametric
approaches may not be working correctly. All this leads us to combine in
our analysis simultaneously the results achieved by both methods.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The continuous growth in demand for local public services together with
the depth and persistence of the current economic recession, have led to
substantial budget imbalances. This scenario makes it necessary to quan-
tify the use that local governments have made of their tax capacity because
12These are variables influencing the tax potential of the municipality and thus indi-
rectly also influencing the tax effort (e.g., the tax bases of local taxes, other indicators of
tax capacity and the impact of the crisis) as well as variables not affecting the potential
tax revenue but directly influencing the municipality’s tax effort (e.g., the pressure of
financial spending, inefficiency in tax collection and the municipality size).
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it can be useful for different purposes: e.g. identify the municipalities that
would be able to increase their tax revenues; help to determine whether
their tax behaviour may be behind the financial solvency problems faced
by municipalities; guide the reform of the local financing system, etc. To
that end, we have calculated the tax effort of Spanish municipalities using
different techniques: the quotient between the tax rates set by local gov-
ernments for their taxes and the maximum legally permitted rates; FDH;
other nonparametric partial frontier approaches and the SFA.
With our paper, we contribute to the implementation of new methodolo-
gies (i.e., partial frontier approaches) in the empirical field of fiscal feder-
alism, and improve the specification of the SFA in the sphere of tax effort,
in two ways. First, we extend the hypotheses explaining tax capacity in-
cluding both general indicators of ability to pay alongside the tax bases
(in order to capture the uneven distribution of taxable bases and avoid
tax management strategies for these bases), and different issues of the so-
cioeconomic context (which identify causes of sample heterogeneity on the
frontier). Second, we add new variables explaining the tax effort, which
help us to understand the heterogeneity of the results. Thus, SFA takes
into account a greater number of factors in the calculation of the tax effort.
All frontier approaches show high average levels of tax effort, which would
suggest the municipalities have exercised their regulatory capacity in the
tax sphere with great responsibility, calling into question the need of the
recent intervention of the central government, which adopted several mea-
sures on local finances (heavier local property tax and spending cuts). How-
ever, a more detailed analysis shows a relevant asymmetry in the behaviour
of the municipalities. On the one hand, most local governments have some
room to raise their tax collection. Our SFA suggest that for that purpose
municipalities can make a more intensive use of their tax authority, e.g.,
raising their tax rates to the maximum legally permitted levels, eliminating
or reducing tax allowances on these taxes, and implementing the optional
taxes if they have not already done so. The model also reveals that an
important part of the unrealized tax effort is due to an inefficient collec-
tion, which prevents collected tax revenues from being as close as possible
to budget. Taking measures to combat corruption, tax evasion and other
inadequate forms of local tax management, can improve the tax effort level
of many municipalities. Other significant variables, which also influence
the local tax effort, are the need to obtain income (pressure of financial
spending), the population, and the political colour of the party in the local
government.
And, on the other hand, there are municipalities whose tax revenues can
hardly increase due to being very close to tax frontier (depending on the
used technique there are municipalities located beyond the frontier). In
order to attend to the possible financing problems of these municipalities,
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it might be desirable to reform the legal framework to allow increase the
maximum tax rates, make the voluntary taxes obligatory, or enable local
governments to access to new tax bases (their own or from other levels
of government). This would make it possible to raise the potential tax
revenue of all municipalities, i.e., to shift the tax frontier, helping to correct
the endemic financial problems that have historically afflicted part of the
Spanish local government level, while leaving the decision on how to use
this potential in hands of each unit of government. All of these would be
consistent with a scenario as heterogeneous as the displayed by the local
tax effort in many countries such as Spain.
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